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SPECIAL REPORT 
Amazigh Activism an 
Paul Silverstein and David Crawford 
W hen primary school students in the major Berber- 
speaking regions of Morocco returned to class in 
September 2004, for the first time ever they were re- 
quired to study Berber (Tamazight) language. The mandatory 
language classes in the Rif, the Middle Atlas, the High Atlas 
and the Sous Valley represent the first significant policy change 
implemented by the Royal Institute of the Amazigh [Berber] 
Culture, a government body established by King Mohammed 
VI on October 17, o00I, following through on a promise made 
in July of that year on the second anniversary of his ascension 
to the Moroccan throne. 
This royal edict, or dahir, represents a dramatic reversal 
of legal discrimination against Imazighen (Berbers) and an 
explicit attempt to reclaim Berberness as "a principal element 
of national culture, as a cultural heritage present across all 
stages of Moroccan history and civilization." Since Moroccan 
nationalist discourse has tended to emphasize links to the 
high culture of Arab-Islamic civilization, and in particular 
the royal patriline leading back to the Prophet Muhammad, 
the dahir indicates a shift in, or at least an amendment to, the 
official national imaginary. Instead of posing Berber culture 
as a challenge to national unity, the king promoted embrac- 
ing it as a necessary step in his project for a "democratic and 
modernist society." 
The dahir and subsequent establishment of the Royal Insti- 
tute, known in Morocco by its French name, l'Institut Royal 
de la Culture Amazighe, or IRCAM, are partly the result of 
domestic and international pressure to create a transparent 
regime of social justice and human rights. These initiatives 
met many of the demands made over the last 20 years by 
the various cultural associations, student groups and politi- 
cal movements associated with the diffuse Amazigh Cultural 
Movement (MCA), and increasingly, the United States and 
other allies have heralded Morocco's reform efforts as a success 
story. The shifts in the national imaginary also signal a cre- 
ative response of the Moroccan state to transnational Islamist 
politics, a response that weds the rhetoric of ethno-national 
identity to a universalist discourse of democracy. The dahir 
thus serves to transform Amazigh militants into allies of the 
state in Morocco's local "war on terror." 
Nonetheless, the creation of IRCAM and its interventions 
to promote Berber art and culture in the spheres of media 
and education have neither gone unopposed within the ranks 
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the Moroccan State 
of Amazigh activists, nor been recognized as anything other 
than distant state "politics" by the mass of Berbers in the 
countryside. Activists have challenged every decision leading 
up to curricular reform, as they suspect that the institute is 
simply a state attempt to coopt the Amazigh opposition and 
turn living Berber culture into static folklore. In spite of the 
dahir, Amazigh militants have been detained repeatedly by 
police and threatened with charges of treason for taking part 
in street demonstrations for Berber land rights and the naming 
ofTamazight as a constitutionally recognized national language 
of Morocco. Such a climate of perceived repression is accepted 
with evident apathy by most Berbers, but has ironically radi- 
calized some Amazigh militants into the ideal supporters of 
George W. Bush's global war on terror. Viewing the Moroccan 
state as a bastion of Arab nationalism, the latter have taken 
increasingly anti-Arab positions that go so far as to deny the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian cause and support the US inva- 
sion of Iraq, positions that have led to conflict with Islamist 
and Marxist opposition groups, as well as with elements of 
Moroccan state security. Rather than assuring national unity, 
the establishment of IRCAM has arguably exacerbated the 
fragmentation of not only the Amazigh movement, but also 
Moroccan oppositional politics in general. 
Amazigh Militancy and State Cooptation 
Berber speakers are estimated to make up 40 percent of the 
Moroccan population.1 In spite of the fact that Muslim Berber 
dynasties controlled Morocco at various points since the arrival 
of Islam, the conflation of Arabic language, Islamic legitimacy 
and Arab ethnicity has nonetheless proved to be an enduring 
feature of Moroccan consciousness. Viewing Berber cultural 
identity as largely a colonial invention designed to fragment 
the Moroccan nation, the I95os nationalist movement-under 
the direction of the Istiqlal Party, consisting primarily of Fez- 
based Francophone elites-sought to forge a univocal identity 
for Moroccans along the ideological lines of an Arab national- 
ism imported primarily from Egypt and Lebanon. Until the 
IRCAM dahir, the monarchy, deriving its temporal authority 
from its religious lineage, had repeatedly underwritten such 
an Arabo-Islamist ideology that has entailed the adoption of 
Arabic as the official and national language of Morocco. 
This version of Moroccan nationalism has faced severe op- 
position, particularly from the Berberophone left. Already in 
the I96os, Berber students and intellectuals in Rabat and Paris, 
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under the aegis of the Association Marocaine de la Recherche 
et des Echanges Culturels (AMREC), began collecting and 
disseminating Berber folklore and oral traditions. In the 1970s, 
these activities became more politicized, with the growth of 
several cultural associations, the Universite d'Ete d'Agadir and 
Tamaynunt, who actively promoted Berber identity.2 How- 
ever, it was the Algerian-Kabyle student uprisings of April 
I980 (known internationally as the Berber Spring) and the 
subsequent solidification of a transnational Berber Cultural 
Movement (MCB) that galvanized Moroccan Amazigh ethno- 
linguistic militancy into a public movement, with conferences 
and a published journal, Amazigh. 
While this movement was largely repressed during the I98os, 
there has been an immense resurgence within the last ten years. 
In 1994, seven teachers, most of whom were members of the 
Amazigh association Tilelli (Freedom) from the southeastern 
oasis town of Goulmima, were arrested after their participa- 
tion in a May Day parade in nearby Errachidia for carrying 
banners written in Tifinagh. Police held the seven for several 
weeks, after which the courts sentenced three of them to 
prison terms and large fines. The three were later released on 
appeal and the charges subsequently dropped after the case 
received widespread international publicity and offers of aid. 
Responding to the outcry, the Moroccan government prom- 
ised reforms, with Prime Minister Abdellatif Fillali opening 
channels for Berber-language programming in the national 
broadcast media and the late King Hassan II declaring in his 
August 1994 Throne Day speech that Amazigh "dialects" were 
"one of the components of the authenticity of our history" 
and should in theory be taught in state schools. Since this 
speech, Amazigh associations and newspapers (now number- 
ing in double digits) have flourished throughout Morocco. In 
a variety of charters and international declarations, Amazigh 
militants have promulgated a redefinition of Morocco on the 
basis of its pre-colonial and pre-Islamic Berber heritage, and 
have sought political change to preserve Berber culture and 
language as a "human right." 
To address these demands the state created IRCAM. The 
institute's 33-member administrative council was recruited 
through the Amazigh associational structure, with an appar- 
ent attempt to garner an equal representation of activists from 
the three major Berberophone regions in the Rif, the Middle 
Atlas and the Sous. Amazigh militants with technical training 
and advanced degrees have likewise been incorporated into 
the institute's seven research centers charged with linguistic 
standardization, pedagogical development, artistic expression, 
anthropological analysis, historical preservation, translation 
and media promotion, and communication. Salaries offered 
to researchers are superior to what could be earned in the state 
school system or even as a teacher in the burgeoning private 
education market. 
Boasting an estimated annual budget of $ioo million, the 
institute is temporarily housed in a hyper-modern commer- 
cial center located in the posh Rabat neighborhood of Hayy 
uutisme me Hoyai msmire oI me Amazlg0 Cuture, 
Riyadh and owned by the Group Ominum North Africa, the 
largest Moroccan enterprise controlled by the royal family. 
The IRCAM is building its own state-of-the-art facility whose 
monumental design incorporates a number of recognizable 
Amazigh motifs. The administrative and research centers are 
fabulously equipped with the latest technology, and the library 
has actively acquired printed and audiovisual materials. Re- 
gardless of any actual policies put in place by IRCAM, such 
expenditures constitute a bold public relations gambit, per- 
forming the commitment to transparent cultural qua human 
rights demanded by US and European interlocutors who hold 
the purse strings for development aid and could recommend 
admittance into the European Union. Morocco's recent posi- 
tive dialogues with the UN and the State Department attest 
to the gambit's initial success.3 
Oppositional Politics 
The repercussions of the establishment of IRCAM for the 
Amazigh movement and Moroccan oppositional politics 
are harder to judge. On the one hand, the institute has suc- 
ceeded in bringing together Amazigh militants from different 
associations and ideological factions. On the eve of the dahir, 
three distinct and opposed groups could be identified: the 
"royalist" Mouvement National Populaire and its allied asso- 
ciations, drawing their major support from the Middle Atlas; 
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the "historical," "moderate" AMREC based in Rabat, whose 
membership is essentially the urban intelligentsia; and the 
"left-wing" Tamaynunt/Universite d'Ete d'Agadir, which drew 
its base primarily from the Sous. Among militants employed 
in the research centers, these divisions proved untenable and 
soon largely broke down. 
On the other hand, the establishment of IRCAM has ef- 
fectively split the movement into two macro-factions: those 
who support the institute's agenda, and those who oppose it, 
either on principle or out of resentment for not having been 
recruited into it. Activists who joined the institute attest to 
the difficulty of the choice, of their foreknowledge that they 
would lose credibility in the eyes of their peers, but in the 
end they believed that they had a better chance of facilitat- 
ing change by working within the system. Today they are 
often denounced by some of their former comrades as hav- 
ing been makhzenise (or even ircamise), of literally having 
been transformed into de facto representatives of the state 
(al-makhzen). Opponents are outspoken in their belief that 
the institute works in the interest of global forces of Arab 
nationalism, publicly declaiming that "IRCAM = IRCAN" 
("filth" in the Tashelhit dialect). 
Dissenters point to several recent institute decisions as 
evidence of IRCAM's hidden "divide and conquer" strategy 
with respect to the transnational Amazigh movement. In 
the first place, they object to the official adoption of the Ti- 
finagh script as the standard means to write Berber language 
in Morocco. The 2003 decision was highly contested within 
IRCAM, decided by only a handful of votes according to one 
of the members of the administrative council, and derived 
in large part from members' fears of threatened Islamist re- 
prisals should the Latin script have been adopted. Although 
officially couched in a language of cultural authenticity, the 
adoption ofTifinagh was, in the end, a political compromise. 
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Nevertheless, many Amazigh militants 
view the decision as a thinly veiled ploy 
to separate Moroccan Berbers from those 
in Kabylia or diaspora France where Ber- 
ber language (Tamazight) is written in 
the Latin alphabet. They also understand 
the production of separate textbooks 
in the three major Moroccan Berber 
dialects (Tarifit, Tamazight and Tashel- 
hit), instead of the standard Tamazight 
developed by Paris-based linguists, as 
part of an effort not only to divide the 
international Berber community, but to 
fragment the national one as well. 
Although peripheral Amazigh activ- 
ists are happy to benefit from IRCAM's 
largesse (in terms of invitations to con- 
ferences or offers to publish their poetry), 
they criticize it for monopolizing the 
public expression of Berber culture at 
the expense of smaller associations and 
grassroots organizational efforts. With 
IRCAM's huge budget and ability to 
attract additional militants to Rabat, 
public funds and activist support for 
local efforts at social development and 
cultural preservation have proven more 
and more scarce, and many Amazigh 
associations are closing their doors. 
With their privileged access to media 
outlets, IRCAM and the Rabat-based 
Centre Tarik bin Zyad run by Hassan 
Aourid, the king's official spokesman 
(porte-parole), have indeed become the 
primary centers for the representation 
of Berberness. A potent example of this 
monopolization is the Imilchil festival, 
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the annual High Atlas moussem where young Berber men and 
women marry supposedly outside of familial negotiations. 
Promoted by the Moroccan state over the last ten years as a 
tourist destination, the festival had become an opportunity 
for local cultural associations to support their yearly activities 
by vending High Atlas Berber arts and crafts, or by being 
paid by the state for their musical and dance performances. 
In 2004, however, the moussem was taken over by Aourid's 
center, which promoted it as an "Amazigh" event, bringing 
in performance groups from across Morocco, Algeria, France 
and Canada. Local associations were excluded from the 
organization and enactment of the festival, a symbolic and 
financial blow that has elicited much criticism. 
In this sense, IRCAM and its sister Rabat organizations have 
further radicalized a number of Amazigh militants in the Mo- 
roccan hinterland and exacerbated a long-standing urban-rural 
divide. In newspaper editorials, on e-mail list-serves, through 
photocopied tracts and during periodic public demonstrations, 
these critics have adopted an increasingly extremist discourse 
in the face of what they see as a persistence of the dominance 
of an Arabized Fez elite. They bemoan the lack of Berber rep- 
resentation in the upper echelons of the government and claim 
the right to create an Amazigh political party. They decry the 
economic marginalization of Berberophone rural areas and call 
for sustained state investment in infrastructure. They demand 
the protection of tribal lands from ongoing expropriation by 
state agents and private speculators, identifying land, like 
language, as an essential part of Berber identity. Finally, they 
promulgate the recognition of Tamazight in the constitution 
as a national and official language of Morocco, and therefore 
a mandatory subject in all schools, not just those attended 
by mostly Berberophone students. The current linguistic 
educational situation, they insist, will only ensure the demise 
of Berber language and the further marginalization of rural 
Berberophones. 
The radical nature of these demands has brought these 
Amazigh militants into occasional confrontation with state 
authorities. On August 29, 2001, Moroccan national security 
officials brought into custody two of the members of Tilelli 
who had previously been arrested in I994 and informed them 
that they would be rearrested and tried for treason for any 
future participation in demonstrations. In March 2004, five 
other Tilelli members were similarly threatened with arrest 
for taking part in an unauthorized sit-in to protest the state's 
cession of five hectares of tribal land to a private investor. 
More poignantly, on April 21, 2004, during a march orga- 
nized to commemorate the twenty-fourth anniversary of the 
Berber Spring, four student militants from the University of 
Agadir branch of the MCA were detained, interrogated and 
severely beaten by police. In every case, association lead- 
ers used the Amazigh press and the virtual organization of 
Amazigh militancy on e-mail list-serves and websites to call 
rapid attention to the confrontations and elicit support. In 
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and high-profile Rabat-based human rights organizations to 
lift the threat of legal repercussions. 
"Arabo-lslamic Imperialism" 
In addition to maintaining a state of low-intensity conflict 
between the Amazigh movement and the state, peripheral 
Amazigh extremism has furthered a rift within Moroccan 
oppositional politics that, ironically, has benefited the state. 
While the Moroccan left-along with the vast majority of the 
Moroccan population, Arab- and Berberophone alike-has 
been vehemently opposed to the US-led war on terror and 
occupation of Iraq, Amazigh militants tend to see Saddam 
Hussein and Osama bin Laden as part of the same scourge 
of "Arabo-Islamic imperialism" that threatens their cultural 
particularity. They are proud to have been among the first to 
offer their public condolences to the US ambassador in the 
days immediately after the September II, 2001 attacks. They 
later came out strongly in favor of the invasion of Iraq and 
were beside themselves with joy over news of the capture of 
Saddam. In Goulmima, residents have even joked that Bush 
must be himself an Ait Murghad (the local Berber tribe), go- 
ing as far as creating a fictive genealogy to incorporate him as 
their symbolic brother. Indeed, their only reproach for Bush 
was why he had not already taken the battle to Saddam's "Arabo- 
Baathist" neighbors in Syria. 
In like fashion, these peripheral Amazigh militants have 
increasingly refused to voice active support for the Palestin- 
ian struggle, viewing the hegemonic pro-Palestinian politics 
of the Moroccan left as a poignant example of imposed Arab 
nationalism. This unwillingness to criticize Israeli state actions 
stems in part from a larger philo-Semitic discourse adopted 
by many Amazigh activists. While by no means the agents of 
the Israeli state that Islamists occasionally accuse them of be- 
ing, some Amazigh militants have actively sought to reconcile 
Jewish and Berber populations, and have publicly advocated a 
normalization of relations with Israel. They generally see in the 
Israelis a direct parallel for the Amazigh struggle: a minority 
people who succeeded in codifying and saving a threatened 
MIDDLE AST REPORT 233 * WINIER 2004 
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language, gained territorial autonomy 
and is currently threatened by a sur- 
rounding Arab majority. 
Such pro-Americanism and philo- 
Semitism have brought many Amazigh 
militants into direct conflict with the 
very leftist groups in which the majority 
of them cut their political teeth in the 
university student unions during the 
1970s and I98os. Accusing the Moroc- 
can left of latent Arab nationalism, a 
number ofAmazigh associations refused 
to participate in-and even actively op- 
posed-the various anti-war rallies and 
May Day demonstrations organized in 
the past several years. The disagreement 
over the Palestinian question has even 
occasionally broken out into violent con- 
frontations between the two movements. 
In what the Amazigh press decried as 
"pseudo-Marxist terrorism" (al-irhab 
al-mutamarks), on December 23, 2003 
members of the Marxist Basiste student 
movement brutally knifed a handful of 
Amazigh student union members at the 
University of Errachidia when the latter 
refused to participate in an exam strike in 
solidarity with the intifada. Although the 
details of the attack remain contested- 
with some claiming that the conflict was 
as racially as ideologically motivated-it 
does point to the ways in which Moroc- 
can oppositional politics have become 
violently fragmented in the years since 
the establishment of IRCAM. 
Unintended Consequences 
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nate some of the main forms of official 
linguistic and cultural discrimination 
in the Moroccan legal and educational 
systems. It serves as a visible symbol 
of an emerging, state-sanctioned civil 
society intended to please international 
observers. While a number of Amazigh 
activists have embraced the institute's 
potential to foster education in the native 
tongue for rural children and to promote 
Berber art and culture in urban public 
spaces, others critique these overtures as 
cultural cooptation by the state designed 
ultimately to divide the transnational 
Amazigh movement. One recalls that 
the late King Hassan II was skilled at 
manipulating ethnic politics, "playing 
different factions off against one another, 
thereby gathering decisive power into 
his own hands."4 Perhaps, the Moroc- 
can monarchy requires divisive ethnic 
politics in order to function. 
But beyond its fragmenting effects on 
opposition politics, the establishment of 
IRCAM underlines how, increasingly, 
cultural and linguistic expression has 
been articulated as a fundamental human 
right in Morocco and internationally. If, 
on an international level, the protection 
of cultural rights has been postulated as 
a precondition for entry into the ranks 
of democracies, on a domestic level it has 
been upheld as a means of fostering na- 
tional unity. But, ironically, the IRCAM 
dahir seems to fetishize Berberness in a 
way that is reminiscent of the protector- 
ate-era "Berber dahir" that inflamed Mo- 
roccan nationalist passion in I930. While 
the new dahir does not outline separate 
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Islamic laws for urban people (under- 
stood to be Arabs) and customary, "tribal" 
laws for rural people (understood to be 
Berbers), it does pave the way for differ- 
ent educational formats in different parts 
of the kingdom. The areas where Berber 
is to be the language of instruction are 
in large part the countryside rather than 
the city, making rural and urban educa- 
tion even more separate-and even less 
equal. In protesting these clearly divisive 
policies, Moroccan Amazigh militants 
have turned to their transnational in- 
terlocutors, soliciting diaspora Berber 
associations and international bodies 
supporting autochthonous peoples' 
rights. Rather than an imagined mod- 
ernist national unity, the establishment 
of IRCAM may serve to underwrite re- 
gional entrenchment and a form of op- 
position politics that seeks to bypass the 
nation-state, not strengthen it. m 
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